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In this article, I argue that a mistaken economy–culture dualism underlies the pitting of
identity politics against class. I propose we be ‘non-dualists’ instead, viewing economic
distributions and cultural representations as importantly co-constitutive, since this non-
dualism lets us best theorise the intersections of injustices like class and race. I argue
that the most sophisticated dualist attempt to transcend class versus identity debates –
Nancy Fraser’s ‘perspectival dualism’ – inadvertently instantiates ‘methodological white-
ness’ and struggles to illuminate the intersections of race and class, overlooking how
culturally specific representations and understandings importantly constitute economic
structures and distributions. Jodi Dean’s contemporary restaging of the class versus
identity debate, I suggest, repeats some of Fraser’s dualist missteps. To end, I propose a
non-dualist approach which understands the economy as an ideological objectification
of certain practices – an objectification which naturalises relations of raced, classed and
gendered domination. Building on social reproduction currents of thought, I suggest a
counter-hegemonic understanding of the economy – one informed by anti-racist, fem-
inist and socialist rethinkings of what constitutes labour and who constitutes the ‘public’
of the economy’s imaginaries of public value.
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A common explanation of recent political shocks holds that a ‘cultural politics of
identity’ has long overshadowed ‘class’ and the economy, and, via Brexit and
Trump, the working class wreaked revenge for being so ignored.1 Pitting class
against identity is not new (e.g. Rorty, 1998). Facing this latest upswell, feminists
and anti-racists have reasserted the need for intersectional analyses which insist ‘on
the irreducible intermingling of race, class, gender, sexuality, and religion’
(Walters, 2018: 483).
Identity politics is ‘the anti-hero with a thousand faces’ (Bickford, 1997: 112)
and I certainly do not defend everything ascribed to this loose category. Following
Walters’ claim that ‘identity politics is where intersectionality lives’ (2018: 482), I
defend what I see as the best of identity politics: intersectional ideas on how forms
of oppression, and the ‘structural identities’ (Cooper, 2016: 390) arising from them,
operate as interwoven and mutually mediating categories.
For those of us interested in Walter’s intersectional project, left critiques of
identity weigh heavier than centrist calls for ‘post-identity liberalism’ (Lilla,
2018) – calls which neither re-centre class nor confront raced or gendered oppres-
sion. The core of left critiques is often the accusation that identity politics directs
attention towards superstructural cultural issues which leave economic structures
intact. Such charges are underpinned by a dualism that sees economy and culture
as mutually exclusive categories, and economy as more ‘real’, ‘material’ or ‘objec-
tive’ than culture.
Economy–culture dualism remains common sense in political philosophy,
theory and public discourse (for discussion, see: Robeyns, 2003; Ives, 2005).
And, though many key intersectional theorists investigate class (e.g. Carby,
1982; Collins, 2000; Combahee River Collective, 2005), economy–culture dualism
likely contributes to how class sometimes sits uneasily apart from listings of race,
gender, sexuality, ‘etc’. Walby et al. diagnose ‘ambivalence as to the location of
class’ in intersectional analyses and consider the intersection of gender and class to
be ‘relatively neglected in current debates’ (2012: 231). While noting that none of
race, class or gender are ‘obviously analogous’, Heyes (2018) states that ‘class in
particular has a distinctively different political history’.2 Yet all agree that class
must be part of intersectional analyses. Given this, along with current restagings of
the identity versus class debate, it is worth looking at economy–culture dualism as
key in reproducing these arguments every decade or so. I argue that to move
beyond this debate – and to best theorise the intersections of class with race,
gender and sexuality – we must abandon economy–culture dualism.
Yet how to examine a position often implicitly assumed rather than argued for?
Here, Nancy Fraser’s work on economic redistribution and cultural recognition is
an invaluable source. Her ‘perspectival dualism’ is the best – most plausible, fully
articulated and influential – form of economy–culture dualism around.3 Arising
from a late 1990s schism between the ‘cultural left’ and the ‘social left’, it is explic-
itly designed to heal identity versus class schisms by retaining focus on economic
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injustices without indulging sexist, racist, heteronormative backlash.4 I argue that
perspectival dualism struggles to illuminate the intersection of race and class, and
that better analyses do not pit the importance of economy and culture against one
another, nor view the economy as an a-cultural, value-free zone.5 I then turn to
Jodi Dean’s contemporary left restaging of identity versus class debates, arguing
that Dean’s implicit economy–culture dualism repeats some of Fraser’s mistakes.
With these lessons in hand, I outline an anti-dualist approach which under-
stands the economy as a harmful theoretical objectification of certain practices
and resources which shores up and naturalises raced, classed and gendered rela-
tions of domination. I argue that it systematically undervalues and overlooks cer-
tain groups’ labour and utilises a conception of commensurable ‘public value’
based on racially exclusionary imaginaries of the public. Drawing on social repro-
duction theory, I suggest how we might build a better, counter-hegemonic under-
standing of the economy. I focus on intersections of race and class because this
topic, and work on it by critical race theorists, deserve wider attention; similar
conclusions could be reached by centring class and gender.
Perspectival dualism
For Fraser, economic redistribution and cultural recognition are different dimen-
sions of, and perspectives on, justice. She aims to navigate between the extremes of
‘deconstructive anti-dualism’ (hereafter ‘anti-dualism’) and ‘substantive dualism’.
Anti-dualism views economy and culture as co-constitutive, and Fraser (2003: 60)
worries that this makes any meaningful economy–culture separation impossible.
By understanding all injustices as necessarily both cultural and economic she
thinks it collapses different systematic injustices into one neatly and necessarily
unified system. For example, calling struggles against sexist social structures ‘eco-
nomic’ risks simplistically collapsing any difference between patriarchy and capi-
talism and assumes that blows to the patriarchy are necessarily blows to
capitalism.
Fraser also thinks of ‘substantive dualism’ – the common modern understand-
ing of economy and culture as two separate, self-contained spheres6 with corre-
sponding spheres of justice – as a non-starter, for it inscribes contingent social
categories that emerge historically from capitalism onto the world itself, problem-
atically naturalising them. Fraser thinks these domains are neither entirely separate
nor rigidly bounded; painting them so reinforces the disassociation of recognition
and redistribution that she wants to undo. These realms are, in fact, ‘more or less
permeable’ (Fraser, 1999: 44). Explaining this permeation, she writes that ‘the
economy is not a culture-free zone, but a culture-instrumentalizing and resignify-
ing one’ (Fraser, 1999: 44). Economic mechanisms take cultural inputs when useful
for capitalist interests – as with gendered divisions of labour, for example – but
economic mechanisms themselves remain a-cultural. However, ‘in practice’, eco-
nomic and cultural injustices are almost always ‘interimbricated so as to reinforce
one another dialectically’ (Fraser, 1995: 72).
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In denying these complex overlappings, substantive dualism is the antithesis of
anti-dualism, which views economy and culture as always co-present and
co-constitutive. Perspectival dualism navigates these extremes by talking of the
‘imbrication’ of two nonetheless ‘relatively autonomous’, ‘partially uncoupled’ and
‘analytically distinct’ social orders (Fraser, 2003: 50, 90). Accordingly, justice
requires two different perspectives: economic-redistributive and cultural-recognitive.
Though virtually every injustice is, in practice, two-dimensional (economic and
cultural), they do not have each dimension equally; they sit along a spectrum. At
one end sit ‘ideal-type’ purely economic injustices – class exploitation as under-
stood by ‘orthodox, economistic Marxism’, for example (Fraser, 2003: 17–20). At
the other end sit ideal-type purely cultural injustices – here Fraser’s preferred
examples are injustices suffered by ‘despised sexualities’ (2003: 17–19). In between
lie injustices ‘at root’ economic or cultural to varying degrees; race and gender sit
mid-spectrum, for example. To sit towards the economic end, an injustice must be
at ‘core’ predominantly ‘rooted in’ the economic social order, meaning accompa-
nying recognitive injustices will largely be derivative effects of redistributive injus-
tice (Fraser, 1999: 27; 2003: 17–19). Injustices can be predominantly rooted in one
social order because of the partial uncoupling of the economic and cultural orders
that capitalism engenders.
However, Fraser has been much criticised for this seemingly ontological ‘root/
core’ language (e.g. Swanson, 2005; Armstrong, 2007). For, if Fraser’s dichotomy
is ontological then perspectival dualism, like substantive dualism, mistakenly
inscribes contingent social categories that emerge from capitalism onto the
world itself, naturalising them.
The most charitable interpretation of perspectival dualism therefore instead
focuses on an alternative explanation of the difference between economic and
cultural injustices which mitigates these ontological overtones. This interprets
Fraser (e.g. 2003: 63) as separating injustices along an economy–culture spectrum
by assessing the relative importance of their economic and cultural origins, where
these categories are socio-theoretical rather than ontological. On this understand-
ing, every injustice is acknowledged to be both economic and cultural, where these
are ‘historically emergent categories of social theory’ (Fraser, 1999: 40).
Fraser never explicitly defines the economy. Her clearest statement on this
responds to Butler’s (1998) arguments for including the production of humans
themselves in the category of the economic, making heterosexism and the regula-
tion of sexuality economic too. Fraser claims that this fails to improve on her
‘simpler strategy of restricting the term economic to its capitalist meaning’
(1998: 146).
Fraser often uses ‘the economy’, ‘capitalism’ and ‘markets’ synonymously
(1998: 146, footnote 6; 1999: 36). An imagined society in which the economic
order entirely subsumes the cultural order is ‘fully marketized’: markets decide
everything (Fraser, 2003: 52). Markets alone are listed as the economy’s ‘core
institutions’ (Fraser, 2003: 58). Accordingly, markets distinguish the economic
and cultural social orders: economic ordering is ‘typically institutionalized in
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markets’; cultural ordering works through institutions like ‘kinship, religion, and
law’ (Fraser, 2003: 51). For Fraser, the economy is ‘objective’ and the cultural
order is ‘intersubjective’ (2003: 49), though she never directly explains why. She
denies that this distinction rests on a materialist–idealist dualism (Fraser, 1998).
Instead, the economy’s objectivity appears based on its value-free, impersonal,
autonomous mechanisms, ‘logic’ and structure, as opposed to culture’s value-
laden, intersubjective ‘patterns’ (Fraser, 2003: 50).
Perspectival dualism, then, assesses the relative importance of the social-
theoretical categories of economy and culture in explaining an injustice. Though
charitable, this interpretation takes perspectival dualism a big step closer to anti-
dualism by understanding it to view every injustice as simultaneously cultural and
economic, albeit to different degrees. Two features keep the theory from collapsing
into anti-dualism: Fraser’s economy–culture spectrum imagery, and her under-
standing of economic and cultural social orders as relatively autonomous and
analytically distinct. Using two of Fraser’s examples, I now argue that we
should reject these features and embrace anti-dualism.
Against an economy–culture spectrum
In the first example, a skilled white male industrial worker becomes unemployed
when his factory closes. Fraser writes that this distributive injustice has little to do
with misrecognition: ‘it is rather a consequence of imperatives intrinsic to an order
of specialized economic relations whose raison d’être is the accumulation of prof-
its. To handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond cultural value
patterns to examine the structure of capitalism’ (2003: 34). Our white worker’s
injustice sits tight towards the economy end of Fraser’s spectrum; he is portrayed
as suffering as pure a case of economic injustice as possible, given the concession
that all injustices have some dual aspect to them.
Yet this portrayal is problematic. Critical race theorists and feminists have long
challenged assumptions that the white, male experience is the ‘neutral’ classed
experience. Racism ‘ensures that black men do not have the same relations to
patriarchal/capitalist hierarchies as white men’ (Carby, 1982: 212). In the UK,
for example, ‘most ethnic groups fared worse during the [2008] recession because
of higher non-employment, fewer hours worked, lower labour-market earnings,
lower self-employment rates, lower self-employment earnings, lower investment
income and higher housing costs’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2015). Our
white worker, then, will likely experience both employment and unemployment
very differently to workers of colour.
His whiteness also affects community perception of his unemployment and, in
turn, the political sympathy available to him and the compound harms likely to
follow. White workers more easily translate skills into re-employment, for example
(Chief, 2016). Furthermore, the ‘white working class’ is afforded attention that
working-class people of colour can only wish for – attention focused on differen-
tiating them from the rest of the working class via race and gender, rather than on
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class barriers and injustices themselves (e.g. The White Season, 2008; Maidment,
2018). Take popular arguments claiming that the eclipse of class by identity politics
uniquely harmed the white, male, working class, as if the struggles of other sections
of the working class can simply be transformed into class-quietist gender or race
politics.
Subordinating misrecognition, then, is not the only way that cultural recognition
importantly affects injustices.7 Supposing cultural patterns do not importantly
shape this injustice is a case of ‘methodological whiteness’ (Bhambra, 2017): a fail-
ure to acknowledge how race structures the world, resulting in treating a limited
perspective, derived from white experience, as universal. In doing so, such
approaches deny their own politics of identity. We cannot unify class politics,
anti-racism and feminism by isolating supposedly pure cases for analysis and
then adding our results together. We must rather recognise how raced and gen-
dered recognition importantly shapes all workers’ economic experiences.
Perspectival dualism tries to untangle raced misrecognition from class subordina-
tion, but both often manifest in experiences simultaneously co-constituted by class
and race.
We must therefore reject Fraser’s economy–culture spectrum. There is no race-
neutral class injustice the remedy for which suits white workers as perfectly as it
suits workers of colour. To ignore this perpetuates methodological whiteness since
the status quo falls back on white experiences as universal. Try as we might to find
a case as close to the ‘economy’ end of the spectrum as possible, raced recognition
remains important, pulling us back to an approach in which cultural recognition
importantly shapes all economic injustices.
Against the economy as an autonomous a-cultural zone
I now argue against the second feature keeping perspectival dualism distinct from
anti-dualism: Fraser’s understanding of the economy as an analytically distinct,
relatively autonomous zone of objective a-cultural structures and strategic behav-
iours. I argue that this understanding struggles to make sense of Fraser’s second
example: the injustice suffered by an African American Wall Street banker who
cannot hail a taxi. Fraser sees little of redistributive importance to this case; hence
the need to ‘reach beyond’ economic distributions to examine cultural value pat-
terns. I suggest that perspectival dualism, even culled of its dubious ontological
baggage, overlooks important mechanisms through which injustices like this arise
and repeat.
Why will taxis not stop for our banker? Presumably because of racist cultural
representations, as Fraser implies. But representations do not arise from nowhere;
they must be produced and reproduced. Representations of black men as bad or
risky customers cannot be divorced from a history in which black people were
portrayed as less than fully human – as irrational and bestial – to justify and
explain European expropriation of black land, labour and lives (Wynter, 2003).
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Colonial redistributions of rights and goods relied on and facilitated racist repre-
sentations from the start.
The afterlives of these representations remain powerful today. African
Americans are frequently denied economic goods, services and opportunities
because of these representations; our banker’s lack of a taxi is one instance of a
wider phenomenon which means that, as a group, African Americans are poorer
(Bonilla-Silva, 2017: 2–25; Quillian et al., 2017). In these ways, racist representa-
tions importantly structure distributions.
Moreover, these distributive injustices play an important role in the contempo-
rary justification and reproduction of representations of African Americans as
bad, risky economic agents (Bonilla-Silva, 2017: 1, 39–43). Take Obama’s speech
to young black men: ‘[T]oo many young men in our community continue to make
bad choices’. He ‘confesses’ that ‘sometimes I wrote off my own failings as just
another example of the world trying to keep a black man down. But . . . excuses are
tools of the incompetent’ (cited in Coates, 2013). This is emblematic of the ten-
dency to represent black poverty as individual irrationality (‘bad choices’).
Racist representations present themselves as explaining contemporary raced
distributions, when they in fact help to generate these distributions. We can
describe this as apparent verification by systemic production (Wynter, 2003:
326). The racist representations suffered by our banker and raced distributions
across the US are co-constitutive – they co-evolve, mutually constituting and
reconstituting one another to reproduce a raced social order. Even if our banker
somehow previously avoided these distributive injustices, they nonetheless play a
key role in reproducing the raced representations which leave him taxi-less.
Perspectival dualists’ painting of such injustices as ‘more cultural than economic’
conceals this.
Tracing the co-constitutive distributive and representative origins of our bank-
er’s experience not only helps explain the contemporary persistence of racism; it
also puts our banker’s experience into a vital broader social context, showing its
inseparability from the wider story of contemporary anti-black racism. We miss
too much by separating the intersubjective ideological/representational elements of
racism from its manifestations in distributions, to weigh their importance against
one another.
Perspectival dualists cannot acknowledge this important co-constitution of rep-
resentations and distributions. For, note that Fraser’s insistence regarding the
‘analytic distinctness’ of economic and cultural perspectives (e.g. 2003: 50)
cannot only be an insistence that economy and culture mean different things.
Even Butler (1998) – arch-anti-dualist in Fraser’s eyes – does not suggest that
the terms mean the same thing, only that the line between them is fuzzy and
unstable. If this were all that Fraser’s ‘analytic distinctness’ meant, her whole
project would oppose a straw person. She must retain some stronger sense of
the ‘analytic distinctness’ of economy and culture than simply that they centre
different aspects of social reality.
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More likely, Fraser means that the categories are ‘analytically distinct’ in that
they divide aspects of the social into two mutually exclusive kinds – economic-
distributive and cultural-representative. On this interpretation, perspectival dual-
ism splits co-constitutive representation–distribution loops into mutually exclusive
halves for analysis because it uses dominant contemporary categorisations of econ-
omy and culture that are themselves mutually exclusive. This retains Fraser’s dis-
tance from Butler’s anti-dualism. The raced representations just discussed are then
themselves non-economic by definition – at most, ‘inputs’ to the economy.
But, in addition to its methodological whiteness, this dominant economy/cul-
ture split serves a purpose within capitalism. Painting the economy as an a-cultural
realm of objective facts, mechanisms and strategic imperatives sets it beyond the
contingency of politics and culture – beyond dispute. Viewing the ‘strategic logic’
of homo oeconomicus as an objective a-cultural reality renders it non-theorisable as
a particularly western ‘culture and class-specific’ conception of human behaviour
(Wynter, 2003: 282). It matters little that we use this framing because it is histor-
ically dominant rather than because we see deep ontological truth in it; reproduc-
ing it within our social theory still strengthens its hold. This politically laden
economy/culture split is too friendly to capitalism’s preferred colour-blind,
value-neutral self-portrayal.
Nor can perspectival dualists fix this by altering the cut made between economy
and culture. We cannot coherently divide these loops into mutually exclusive
halves because economic-distributive ‘mechanisms’ are created and reproduced
through cultural representations, making them vital parts of the economic struc-
ture. Contra Fraser (2003: 34), cultural value patterns are not ‘beyond’ the struc-
ture of capitalism but integral to it, as I now argue.
First, raced representations structure supposedly a-cultural, ‘strategic’ economic
agency. The taxi case shows how economic decisions are commonly mediated
through racist representations, structuring resulting distributions. When African
Americans are denied goods, services and opportunities on offer to their white
counterparts, each denial is a ‘strategic economic choice’. The uncertainties of real-
world economic choices leave space for raced rules of thumb to guide actions.
These representations structure our practices, and therefore come to constitute
our social relations. These networks of relations in turn constitute our social
structures – in this case, ‘the economy’.
Second, raced representations structure the economy through law. Fraser sees
law as cultural, but US law continues to protect ‘whiteness as property’ – whiteness
as a status according to which societal benefits are allocated (Harris, 1993).
Recently revived arguments that affirmative action discriminates against whites
have led courts to severely limit affirmative action, which is banned altogether in
eight states (Economist, 2017). As courts view the normal workings of the economy
as race neutral, they see race-based affirmative action as discriminatory, defending
whites’ settled expectations of greater shares of jobs and education as a ‘neutral’
economic baseline (Harris, 1993: 1750–1790).
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Or, take the legal construction of home carers, agricultural workers, immigra-
tion detainees and prison labourers – all disproportionately people of colour – as
not proper ‘workers’, thus denying them standard workers’ rights (Zatz and Boris,
2013).8 Home carers (disproportionately women of colour) are not covered by the
Fair Labor Standards Act, even if employed by a for-profit company. Arising from
the raced feminisation of their labour, such understandings help perpetuate current
economic distributions (Boris and Klein, 2012). Finally, take how western capital-
ist understandings of what constitutes labour are used to appropriate indigenous
land in settler-colonial contexts (Povinelli, 1995). Raced representations are there-
fore not best understood as mere ‘inputs’; by patterning ‘strategic’ agency and
informing the legal framework limiting and constituting economic activity, they
structure the economy.
More generally, without underpinning representations in the form of norms,
concepts and narratives – and their codification in law – there is no ‘specialised
marketised zone’. Capitalist markets require laws determining who is a ‘worker’,
and norms enabling decision-making under uncertainty. Fraser’s ‘fully marketised
society’ is a fantasy: no market can exist without legal frameworks and social
norms underpinning its function and setting its form. These frameworks and
norms cannot themselves be marketised on pain of regress. The supposed ‘auton-
omy’ of markets is one of capitalism’s myths; left-leaning, feminist, anti-racist
approaches should not perpetuate it.
Our stranded banker cannot get a taxi due to racist representations but, I have
argued, if we end our analysis there, our understanding of this injustice remains
shallow. To understand the continuing prevalence and power of such representa-
tions, we must understand how they are co-constituted by raced distributions. The
cultural representations and economic distributions that comprise systemic anti-
black racism co-evolve and co-constitute one another. Fraser’s adoption of the
dominant capitalist method of splitting this co-constitutive loop instantiates meth-
odological whiteness and problematically depoliticises the economy.
But we cannot improve this spilt; these loops cannot be divided into mutually
exclusive halves since the ‘specialised marketised zone’ is necessarily structured by
representations. Understanding the economy as an a-cultural, analytically distinct,
partially autonomous zone is politically problematic and implausibly ungrounded.
To best understand our banker’s experience, we should view economic distribu-
tions as importantly co-constituted by cultural representations.
Contemporary left critiques of identity politics: the case
of Jodi Dean
Jodi Dean’s work shows promising signs of having shed perspectival dualism’s
methodological whiteness. She argues against coding the working class as white,
and thinks expropriation and extraction as well as waged exploitation form the
basis of class struggle (Dean, 2016b). She views her communism as informed by
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struggles over civil and women’s rights, gay and trans rights (Dean, 2012: 184) and
envisages a Communist Party (her preferred political-organisational form) work-
ing as a solidaristic resource and consciousness-raising space for women and
people of colour (Dean, 2016a: 211–231). That she is nonetheless a strident critic
of identity politics should therefore worry those of us interested in intersectional
analyses of structural identities.
For Dean, identity politics is necessarily individualistic, depoliticising and frag-
menting – it inhibits solidarity and relies on the exclusion of class. She tires of
hearing ‘ad infinitum’ that the personal is political, which she sees as excluding
structural analyses by shrinking politics to personal value bids based on the unique
authenticity of one’s own experiences (Dean, 2016a: 264; 2016b). And she decries
the ‘fixity’ read into identity categories (Dean, 2016b).
Against this, Dean advocates class struggle that unites us as a collective, ‘the
people’. The people are a political category defined by their shared experiences of
capitalist exploitation and expropriation, and therefore apparently avoid the logic
of identity politics (Dean, 2012: 80). Unlike Dean’s version of identity politics, the
people’s collective identity is not reducible to individual identities; it is a ‘common
relation to a common condition of division’ (2012: 191). For example, the Occupy
slogan ‘we are the 99%’ ‘does not unify this collectivity under a substantial identity
– race, ethnicity, nationality’ (Dean, 2012: 200).
It is unclear what Dean means by labelling race, but not ‘the people’, as a
‘substantial’ identity, given the widespread critical acceptance that races are
socio-political constructs not biological groups. Nor is it uncommon for anti-
racist theory and practice to understand race as arising from and based on
antagonistic oppressive social relations. For example, race ‘names a relation of
subordination’ (Chen, 2013; also Bonilla-Silva, 2017: 9–10). As Barbara
Tomlinson points out, for those concerned with anti-subordination, ‘the experi-
ence and subjectivity of specific identities is not really the focus of the argument
but rather a proxy or tool to examine and counter structural injustice and subor-
dination’ (2013: 1000).
Dean therefore invokes classed subjectification in similar ways to how the best
discussions of race invoke raced identity; ‘the people’ are not the only subject
produced through certain modes of subordination or exploitation. By portraying
the people as unique in utilising a collective, non-essentialist subject/identity cat-
egory for political struggle, Dean unfairly caricatures too much good theory and
activism.
Dean pits class struggle against identity politics in a second way. She under-
stands class struggle as the ‘fundamental antagonism through which society
emerges’ (Dean, 2012: 82). Explaining, she writes that class struggle ‘operates
according to a logic fundamentally different from that of identity politics’
(Dean, 2006: 57). Whereas feminist, gay, and anti-racist activists’ basic goal is,
she argues, to ‘find ways of getting along. . . to translate antagonism into differ-
ence’, class struggle does not aim for ‘mutual recognition or respect’ but rather at
‘transforming relations of production so as to eliminate capitalism altogether’
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(Dean, 2006: 57–58). Dean’s second reason for pitting identity against class thus
invokes familiar metaphors of cultural superstructural recognition versus founda-
tional economic relations of production.
In line with this, Dean criticises the Left for limiting itself to ‘small battles,
policy options, and cultural interventions, victories that can be absorbed and
defeats that can be forgotten’ (2016a: 25). These victories can be absorbed because
identity politics based on gender, race or sexuality leave ‘communicative capital-
ism’s basic structure intact’ (Dean, 2016b). Only the full inclusion of ‘the people’ is
theorised as capable of ‘distorting and disrupting’ the capitalist order, not the full
inclusion of women or people of colour (Dean, 2012: 80–82). Racism, then, is not
part of capitalism’s ‘basic structure’ but part of its cultural superstructure.
This strikes a warning bell that gets louder when Dean reveals the exact con-
tours of her economy–culture cut. For example, ‘labour unrest’ counts as econom-
ic, but conflicts around ‘abortion, pornography, busing, crime, affirmative action,
and gay rights’ are ‘cultural’ (Dean, 2012: 63). Anti-harassment law is understood
as more problematically individualistic and less a matter of ‘broad economic jus-
tice’ than wage and pension law advances (Dean, 2012: 44–45, 63).
This kind of economy–culture cut – construing issues like crime as individual-
istic cultural conflicts, in contrast to struggles for wages and pensions – again
instantiates methodological whiteness. After all, the criminal justice system
marks people of colour as ‘criminals’ and uses this labelling to limit their access
to a wage via employment discrimination, and to economic goods like housing,
education and benefits (Alexander, 2012). While incarcerated, prisoners work for
below minimum wage without the legal protections afforded to ‘employees’. The
criminal justice system thus crucially shapes the forms of exploitation and expro-
priation that people of colour experience.
This cut also instantiates methodological maleness, given how criminalising
abortion denies women control over their reproductive labour and workplace
harassment conditions their access to a stable wage. By categorising these as indi-
vidualistic cultural issues, Dean reinforces the misguided representation of these
practices as outside the basic structure of the economy. Sure, struggles around
crime and abortion do not necessarily abolish capitalism. But nor does union
organising for paid sick leave or unemployment support – actions which Dean
readily classifies as the people ‘disciplining capital’ (2012: 44). While Dean is surely
right that ‘not all feminist and antiracist struggles are necessarily progressive’
(2006: 59), this does not prove that class is more ‘fundamental’ than race or
gender; not all class struggles are necessarily progressive either (e.g. Wrench, 1989).
By assuming that capitalism’s basic structure is unraced and ungendered, and
thus that struggles along the lines of raced or gendered identities are ‘cultural’,
Dean repeats Fraser’s mistakes. Our legal definitions of ‘work’ and ‘workers’ are
raced and gendered, producing gender- and race-specific forms of economic exploi-
tation and expropriation. Because the raced and gendered representations that
structure the economy are both cultural and economic, the battle that Dean
draws between ‘cultural’ politics based on gendered and raced identities and
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class struggle based on relations of antagonistic capitalist exploitation and expro-
priation is simplistic and unhelpful.9
Unsurprisingly, the economy–culture dualism underlying Dean’s view also
struggles to make sense of the intersection of race and class. Take Dean’s analysis
of the 2014–2015 riots in Ferguson and Baltimore, USA. Dean writes that ‘identity
as an operator for politics is now itself fully saturated’ (2016a: 256): it allows for no
more useful political work and is now only damaging, ‘reducing the space of
change to the individual’ and encouraging solidarity-sapping calling out and sham-
ing. She thinks the most striking symptom of identity’s saturation is the ‘economic
rupturing of identity categories, that is to say, the emergence of identities as them-
selves sites of class struggle’ as seen in these riots (Dean, 2016a: 257).
It is hard to tally her claims that identity does only damage with her acknowl-
edgement of the radical challenge these riots presented to the economy’s basic
structure, for the riots happened under the banner of an unapologetically ‘sub-
stantive’ black identity. Her economy–culture dualism cannot make sense of strug-
gles that are both economic and emerge along the lines of raced identity. Like
Fraser, Dean seems to envisage ‘cultural’ identity politics and class struggle as
mutually exclusive categories of analysis. And, like Fraser’s, Dean’s approach
fails to make sense of a world in which important concepts, structures and strug-
gles are fundamentally both economic and cultural. Jonathan Dean’s (2015) ‘new
communism’ therefore repeats some old mistakes.
A non-dualist proposal
Key to economy–culture dualism is the assumption that the categories of economy
and culture divide the social into two mutually exclusive kinds. Giving up this
dualism need not force us into monism, however – we need not think the concepts
are interchangeable or that they collapse into one another. Between dualistic
mutual exclusivity and monism lies a whole spectrum of non-dualist possibilities.
I now propose one such non-dualist understanding of the economy. The economy,
I argue, is an ideological objectification of particular practices and resources
marked as of commensurable public value by dominant common sense. The imag-
ined ‘public’ in question over-represents dominant groups, meaning the common-
sense evaluations involved in demarcating ‘the economy’ likewise overvalue their
labour and interests. In this, I build on Wynter’s (2003) suggestion that ‘the econ-
omy’ is a science of reproducing the conditions of life for a particular kind of
person – a white, upper-class man. To end, I explore the implications of this for
class versus identity debates.
Co-constitutive racist representations and racist distributions structure our
social practices and so come to constitute our social relations. Above, I suggested
we single out one network of social relations which we objectify as the social
structure, ‘the economy’. To build on this, some theoretical background is helpful.
Social structures, as used here, are ‘theoretical entities, postulated to do work in a
social theory’ which are constituted, to an important degree, by social relations
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(Haslanger, 2016: 114). Social relations are in turn constituted by social practices:
patterns of co-ordination behaviour that respond to social resources (broadly
understood) as these resources are interpreted and shaped by cultural meanings
(Haslanger, 2018: 245).
For example, in UK offices the practice of making tea responds to the resources
of tea, coffee, etc. (culturally appropriate workplace drinks), and the time and
labour involved in making these (culturally gendered female and ‘domestic’).
This practice part-constitutes hierarchical social relations if women workers are
always tasked with making tea for everyone in a meeting. This hierarchical social
relation would then constitute part of ‘the patriarchy’ – a theoretical entity pos-
tulated by feminist theory to objectify gendered relations of domination.
The economy is a social structure in this sense – a theoretical entity that objec-
tifies certain relations and the practices that constitute them, including the resour-
ces and cultural understandings involved in these practices. However, unlike
critical theoretical entities like ‘patriarchy’ or ‘white supremacy’ which do vital
work in social theory (and which are Haslanger’s focus), ‘the economy’ does harm-
ful ideological work. It shores up relations of domination and subordination by
systematically overvaluing certain resources, labour and lives and overlooking or
devaluing others, while presenting as a transparent, neutral representation of
reality.
It is controversial to call the economy a ‘social structure’. Swanson (2005: 89)
thinks this label is ‘theoretically untenable and politically debilitating insofar as it
treats social practices like capitalism as autonomous and relatively intractable
structures and leaves their complexity and contingency under-theorized’.
However, the understanding of social structures adopted here is designed to
defang such worries. Haslanger does not naturalise, fetishise or ahistoricise
social structures. They are understood as only as intractable as the social relations
that constitute them – relations which are the contingent results of historical pro-
cesses, neither unchanging nor necessarily uncontradictory.
Understanding the economy as an ideologically harmful objectification of a
specific set of social relations undoes any separation of human subjects and prac-
tices from mysterious, ‘objective’ social structures. This is an important step
beyond the mere ‘addition’ of class and race: it frees us from unhelpful imaginaries
that see class but not race as arising from an objective economic realm, setting class
up as more objective than race’s supposedly subjective character. Just as white
supremacy is constituted by the actions and relationships of human subjects (and
their material frameworks), so too is the economy – no hierarchy of objectivity is
suggested.
Which practices – responding to which resources, and interpreted by what cul-
tural meanings – constitute ‘the economy’, then? The term selects according to
dominant common-sense evaluations of which practices are important to the pro-
duction, distribution or consumption of resources (including labour) of commen-
surable public value, and in what ways. The economy is therefore demarcated by
three evaluations: first, of which practices are significant to the production,
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distribution or consumption of publicly valuable resources; second, of which
resources are of public, commensurable value; third, of the kind of value/disvalue
of these economic resources. I now turn to how this economic/non-economic
demarcation shores up relations of domination and subordination by systemati-
cally overvaluing certain practices, resources and lives while devaluing others.
First, note that on this approach the practices constituting ‘the economy’ will
always have a cultural dimension. Like all social practices, economic practices rely
on a cluster of concepts, beliefs, narratives and attitudes which make them and the
resources they involve intelligible to participants, and therefore allow for practices’
repetition. For example, market exchange practices rely on culturally specific con-
cepts (price, ownership, etc.), beliefs (e.g. in the value of a currency) and narratives
about what is appropriate to exchange with whom. You won’t get far trying to sell
an eight-year-old a car; you could sell them a snack, but if you are that child’s
parent you break the conventional bounds of this practice by doing so.
Acknowledging the cultural dimension of economic practices lets us explore the
culture and class specificity of their logic (Wynter, 2003: 282).
Dominant conceptions of the economy centre practices of marketised exchange,
understood as comprised of equal individuals with different bundles of resources
and needs trading things of equivalent value according to our pre-given utility
curves. Inhabitants of this sphere are conceived as neoclassical homo economicus,
a character so wilfully abstracted from social context that many economics text-
books start their reasoning from Robinson Crusoe (Watson, 2018). On this under-
standing, the economy is constituted by market exchanges (along with the practices
of production and consumption that keep these exchanges ticking over) and the
resources accorded supposedly a-cultural financial value by these exchanges.
Left theorists correctly point out that this neoclassical picture overemphasises
formally equal exchange relations, overlooks relations of domination arising from
differential ownership of the means of production and overvalues and naturalises
marketised practices as at once efficient, fair and neutral. In these ways, this
common-sense theoretical entity, ‘the economy’, helps shore up relations of classed
domination. And feminists correctly point out that it shores up gendered
domination by devaluing (under-paid) or ignoring (unpaid) practices of care and
reproductive labour. Furthermore, when the caring/mothering practices of
working-class women are included in the economy, it is because they are seen as
dangerously destructive of economic value; these women are portrayed as hyper-
visual sites of public expense by dominant discourses which cast them as ‘drains on
national resources’ (Hancock, 2003: 44; emphasis mine).
Similarly, common-sense demarcations of the economy ignore and undervalue
raced labour practices and cast people of colour as of potentially destructive eco-
nomic disvalue. As we have seen, work practices raced non-white are overlooked
and undervalued in cases like those of home carers, prison workers and immigra-
tion detainees, locking participants into relations of hyper-exploitation without
basic legal protections. A particularly clear statement of this devaluation came
when the UK Government excluded immigration detainees from minimum wage
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laws on the grounds that the minimum wage would not ‘reflect the true economic
value of the work likely to be carried out’ (UK Parliament, 2005; emphasis mine).
As Bales and Mayblin (2018: 200) point out, the immigration status of detainees
determines the value of this work: ‘they perform the same jobs as their citizen
counterparts . . . at a rate of 13 per cent of the national minimum wage’.
Relatedly, the bounds of the economy are drawn by calculations of commen-
surable public value based on a dominant whitewashed cultural representation of
the public. A Supreme Court Justice defended home carers’ non-worker status on
the grounds that if these carers were covered by wage laws, millions would be
unable to afford care, making denying them worker status in the public interest
(Boris and Klein, 2012: 8). The value of legal protections and minimum wages for
home carers does not figure as a relevant part of this calculation of public interest
because the ‘public’ involved quietly excludes them.
Similarly, Brexit debates drew on and solidified a raced representation of ‘the
people’. Nationalist rhetoric – ‘we want our country back’ – represented ‘a wilful
whitening of class identities for racist ends’ by political elites (Bhattacharyya, 2017:
20). Just as the gendered public/private divide animates common-sense under-
standings of the economy, so too do racially exclusionary imaginaries of national
communities. Such imaginaries animate a conception of ‘public value’ that quietly
elides people of colour’s labour and lives.
Given this exclusion from the relevant imagined communities, it is perhaps
unsurprising that when people of colour are included in the economy, it is often
because they are presented as involved in practices that importantly threaten or
destroy economic value. Despite much evidence refuting a connection between
recent immigration and crime, British people remain convinced that recent immi-
grants – especially undocumented ones – represent a serious criminal threat
(Stansfield and Stone, 2018: 604). This is one example of how people of colour
are cast as endangering economic value. Media photo captions in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina describing black people as ‘looting’ but white people doing the
same thing as ‘finding bread and soda’ (Ralli, 2005) evoke a similar logic. Our
black banker who cannot get a taxi suffers the consequences of this, excluding him
from equal economic participation.
Therefore, as commonly used, ‘the economy’ selects a group of practices accord-
ing to dominant common-sense evaluations of which practices are important for
the production, distribution or consumption of resources of commensurable public
value, and in what ways. These evaluations systematically overlook the labour and
interests of people of colour, and when people of colour are included in ‘the
economy’ they are often cast as active threats to economic value. The economy,
then, is a theoretical entity whose terms and boundaries support the illusion that
white people sustain the efficient production, distribution and constructive con-
sumption of things of value while people of colour drain or threaten such resources
and practices. Its methods of picking out, valuing and naturalising a certain net-
work of practices help maintain raced (gendered, and classed) relations of
domination.
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Designating a practice as ‘economic’ is therefore not an ‘ultimately arbitrary’
categorisation (contra Swanson, 2005: 95). To be admitted into the category of the
economic is either to have established your practice as one that produces, distrib-
utes or consumes resources of a certain kind of public value, or to have it marked
as threatening this value. This designation is not ontological, but it is performative
and powerful: once a practice, person or resource is seen as valuable/unvaluable in
this way it has very real implications. For one thing, casting people of colour not
only as less productive but as potential destroyers of economic value helps dehu-
manise them and results in (and justifies) their subjection to greater violence in the
name of securing value. Let me take these in turn.
In our current moment, when to be fully human is to fit the mould of homo-
economicus, it is unsurprising that we dehumanise those cast as dangerous to this
achievement. The economic is intimately bound up with the contemporary cate-
gory of the human (Wynter, 2003); as Bhattacharyya puts it, ‘something in the
status of “worker” and perhaps “potential worker” . . . slides into the demarcation
of the human under capitalism’ (2018: 65). This is unsurprising, perhaps, given the
neoliberal creep of economisation and the resultant increased subservience of
imaginaries of non-economic value to the economy.
With the dehumanisation of those deemed economic threats comes violence
done in the name of securing economic value. So, when immigration detainee
Jimmy Mubenga, already handcuffed, is killed by UK immigration guards on a
crowded plane, we find that the guards sent dozens of racist messages like this one:
‘Fuck off and go home you free-loading, benefit grabbing, kid producing, violent,
non-English speaking cock suckers . . .’ (Lowenstein, 2015). Likewise, the unarmed
child Trayvon Martin is killed for looking like a burglar to George Zimmerman,
who saw him as one of those ‘punks’ who ‘always get away’ (Yankah, 2013). This
violence is done, in part, in the name of securing ‘the economy’ – a set of practices
which reproduce the conditions of life of a whitewashed public through exploita-
tion, expropriation and exclusion.
This understanding of the economy accords with Skeggs’ (2014: 1) argument
that economic value and wider social values are ‘always dialogic, dependent, and
co-constituting’. It recognises how racist moral and social devaluations of people
of colour and the work they do cannot be untangled from their economic deval-
uation. Common-sense economic evaluations of what practices importantly pro-
duce, distribute or consume resources of commensurable public value are always
also cultural, ethico-political evaluations.
The economy–culture dualism still has many advocates across public and aca-
demic discourse – as the recent uptick in ‘class versus identity’ explanations sug-
gests. However, elsewhere moves towards theorising the co-constituting relations
of class, gender, race and sexuality are gaining ground, as evidenced by the recent
resurgent interest in social reproduction theory (e.g. Camfield, 2016; Bhattacharya,
2017; Bhattacharyya, 2018; Fraser et al., 2018). To end, I explain how social
reproduction approaches aid escape from the class versus identity impasse, and
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how the non-dualist conception of the economy outlined above harmonises with
and builds on such approaches.
The cornerstone of social reproduction theory is an expanded conception of
labour integrating ‘reproductive’ and ‘productive’ work. For example, Camfield
(2016: 300) understands labour as ‘conscious, meaning-saturated activity through
which embodied subjects relate to each other and the rest of nature and in so doing
produce and reproduce the social’.10 Befitting its Marxist Feminist origins, caring
practices – paid or unpaid – are central exemplars of labour on this approach. This
widening of the category of work reveals the threads of hyper-exploitation and
expropriation running through the experiences of home care workers, prison
labourers, immigration detainees, as well as women denied control over their
own reproductive labour or subjected to sexual harassment to secure a wage.
This framework lets us talk of certain relations as both capitalist and racist; no
‘pure’ capitalist logic is sought beyond or behind the practices that form and
maintain capitalist social relations. In this way, social reproduction theory offers
important resources for escaping the class versus identity dead end. For it lets us
conceive of these practices of hyper-exploitation and expropriation as raced and
gendered but also importantly classed forms of domination, helping undo the
pitting of raced and gendered ‘identities’ against class.11,12
However, an expanded conception of work alone is not enough to dissolve class
versus identity debates. Recall the dehumanising violence done to those deemed
outside the economy, and their ongoing exclusion; these ‘spaces of death may not
present opportunities for accumulation in any straightforward sense’
(Bhattacharyya, 2018: 20). To make visible the classed dimension of these practices
we must return to the exclusionary nature of dominant conceptions of the ‘public’
which animate the economy, as argued for above.
These violent exclusions – done in the name of protecting a whitewashed
‘public’ – can therefore be understood as, at least in part, a defensive shoring up
of current class hierarchies, either by elites wanting to deflect working-class anger
towards raced outsiders, or by those who feel it the only way to protect their
limited access to the means of sustaining life. Both suggest the urgent necessity
of a strong intersectional class politics, lest people of colour are left to bear the
brunt of class pain mis-directed into ethno-nationalist anger.
In his attempt to theorise gender, race and class together, Camfield rejects a
focus on common-sense understandings of the economy in favour of a focus on
‘the social relations involved in processes of producing the means of human life’
(2016: 293; see also: Bhattacharyya, 2018: 52). Building on this, just as social
reproduction theorists suggest counter-hegemonic understandings of work, we
might likewise suggest a counter-hegemonic understanding of the economy: one
animated by an expanded conception of labour as those practices significant to the
production, reproduction, distribution and consumption of the means of life,
which understands resources’ public value as stemming from their ability to sustain
life and which conceives of the public in question through an imagined community
free from raced exclusions.
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Rather than simply ‘adding on’ sectors here and there (Cameron and Gibson-
Graham, 2003), such an understanding necessitates a fundamental reconception of
the logics through which we draw ‘the economy’ – of which practices are deemed
significant and which resources are deemed valuable/unvaluable to which public,
and why. Rejecting the notion of life in service to financial value, it centres
Bhattacharyya’s (2018: 52-53) call to put the economy in service to life. It invites
anti-racist, feminist and socialist rethinkings of labour and public value, and rec-
ognises the need to connect these to concurrent rethinkings of the category of the
human.
Conclusion
We urgently need intersectional analyses that insist on the irreducible intermin-
gling of race, class and gender; with inequality intensifying and fractures appearing
along overtly raced lines, we lack the luxury of rehearsing another decade of
identity versus class debates. As Dean’s work suggests, contemporary iterations
of these debates remain underlain by economy–culture dualisms which instantiate
methodological whiteness and struggle to analyse the intersections of race and
class.
In place of these dualisms, I proposed an analysis of the economy as a harmful
ideological objectification of certain practices, selected for their supposed impor-
tance to the production, distribution and consumption of resources of commen-
surable public value. I argued the theoretical entity, ‘the economy’, does harmful
social theoretical work, shoring up and naturalising raced, classed and gendered
relations of domination. This economy is importantly structured by both cultural
concepts, meanings and understandings, and by material and immaterial resources
and distributions. To end, I suggested that social reproduction theory can help
dissolve class versus identity debates and used insights from this theoretical current
to inform a counter-hegemonic understanding of the economy – one which, among
other things, calls on us to properly recognise the lives and labour of people of
colour.
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1. This article was accepted for publication in June 2019. E.g. Fraser (2016). Goodhart
(2016) similarly talks of Brexit as a classed ‘peasants’ revolt’ of the ‘left behind’. These
explanations whiten the working class and ignore the driving role of white elites and
middle classes (Bhambra, 2017).
2. Better reasons for the relative de-emphasis of class compared to gender and race lie in
intersectionality’s origins in black feminist thought (Cooper, 2016).
3. Fraser’s recognition/redistribution paradigm looms indicatively large in topic introduc-
tions by Markell (2008) and Squires (2008). Walters borrows terms from Fraser when
she calls identity versus class ‘a battle between a politics of recognition and a politics of
redistribution’ (2018: 481). Fraser’s framework structures studies ranging from the wel-
fare state (Dahl, 2004) and disability (Dodd, 2016), to social work (Boone et al., 2018)
and education (€Ochsner and Murray, 2018).
4. The social left are the old guard, primarily worried about redistribution and class, in
contrast to the younger, cultural left who came of age during the ‘identity politics’ era
(Fraser, 1998).
5. There are signs that, over the years, perspectival dualism became less dualist (compare
Fraser 1995 and 2003). Insofar as this is true, I impress the importance of these con-
cessions and the need to take them further.
6. Mitchell (1998) gives a wonderful genealogy of this view.
7. Awareness of status dominance and subordination also lets us see subordination of
people of colour and women as constitutive of white, male identity.
8. Though it garners less critical attention, much of this also holds true for the UK. Home
care workers likewise struggle to access minimum wages (Merrill, 2016; Plimmer, 2018).
Such work is done primarily by women and ‘increasingly by migrant women’ (Mullally
and Murphy, 2015: 59). McGregor (2007: 814–815) found raced divisions between per-
manent and temporary caring staff, with better working conditions secured by predom-
inantly white permanent carers. The UK has the largest prison population in the EU,
and the most privatised prison system in Europe (Bell, 2013). Prisoners who work earn
an average wage of £9.60 a week (Bell 2013, 59). Black people are more disproportion-
ately imprisoned in the UK than in the US (Lammy 2017, 3). The UK has one of the
largest immigration detention estates in Europe, also increasingly privatised, and pre-
dominantly peopled by detainees of colour who work for well below minimum wage
(Bales and Mayblin 2018).
9. Dean caricatures political struggles around raced identities by casting them as unthreat-
ening to capitalism’s basic structure (cf. Wilderson, 2003: 231). As Jonathan Dean
(2015: 245) argues, the claim that ‘only radical class politics aims at wiping out the
other’s socio-political role and function’ is absurd.
10. Camfield (2016: 291) rejects any material–ideational dualism.
11. So long as class domination includes relations of expropriation and exploitation, as
Dean (2012) agrees it should.
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12. Fraser’s latest paper in fact accords with some of these ideas. Co-authored with two
social reproduction theorists, it abandons recognition versus redistribution language
and any dualistic zero-sum weighing of culture and economy. They aim to be ‘right
in the thick of . . . [class struggle] even as we are helping to redefine it in a new, more
capacious way’ (Fraser et al., 2018: 119). Fraser might have been hugely influential in
outlining economy–culture dualism but this latest shift adds her considerable intellec-
tual weight to the ranks of a more productive approach.
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